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Introduction
In a period in which an event as interesting and important as the formulation of Principles and Rules oj Transnational Civil Procedure hy the
American Law Institute and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROJT) is sternly advancing to accommodate basic
procedural concepts for both the civil and common law systems, a central
problem faced in such conciliation seems to be that of clarifying the actual
roles and responsibilities of judges and lawyers in the conduct of a civil
dispute I To do so will essentially mean scrutinizing the value and validity
of settled conceptions of the inherent features of civil and common lavl
systems, including the notion that these systems are basicaJJy opposite each
01her 2 In other words, we will attempt to evaluate the correctness and
t Geoffrey C Hazard, .Jr, is the Thomas I:: Miller Distinguished Professor 01 Law
at the L!niversity of California Hastings College 01 the Law
tt Angelo Dondi is a Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Genoa Italy
The authors wish tIl thank Dr. Vincenzo .i\nsanelli for the precious help prO\'ic!ed editing
and reshaping 01 the footnotes.
1. Set", eg., A.L.l./L"JI)RlllT. Pln"UI'llS .'\'JI.J Rl"lES OF Tlv\""".c\TIONAI C:I\'II PR\/CFIWRI, DISCLSSIUN D10\1'1 f':l) 4 (2003); sec (llso Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr, Trunsnalio/lal
Rules
Civil Procedure' u Challenge 10 Judge and Lawyers, 51 Sll'DI URI3I"'\ n DI S, II "ZF
Cll;RIDIUII, Pt)LIlI( HI, II) [Cl)"-i11rv1lC.Hl 247 (] 999)
2 Sec, c.g, Michele Taruffo, II proccsso civile iii "civillmv" e eli "common low": mpc((j
.I0ndal11t·nloli, ill 126 11 h)RC) h,\I1.\"I) 345 (20m)
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reliahility or this assertion, as vvell as to the unavoidable opposition it
incurs
Focusing on the respective roles of lawyers and judges is especially
convenient in conceiving a different configuration of the relationship
between civil and common law systems, and reaching a more appropriate
(though maybe less reassuring and simple) vision of the reality. The traditional 'v'iew of the fundamental difference between the so-called "civil" and
"common' law systems in the allegedly crucial different responsibilities of
the judge, on the one hand, and of the advocates for the parties, on the
other, makes such an approach necessary. ~
(Jne question to be considered -the first part of our discussion
below-is 'vvhy the analysis of these responSibilities is conceived as a "natural" pathway for understanding both the characteristics of the two systems
and their mutual relationship represented in itself.
The second part of the discussion will provide a closer inspection of
the nature of these responsibilities, including their functional details.
What too often happens, in our opinion, is that these roles are referred to
in general terms, rather than focusing on their functionality, with the result
of either exaggerating the differences between the systems or disregarding
important similarities.
The third topiC considered will be the widespread trend of procedural
systems toward reducing their mutual differences. We would tend to identify-roughly speaking-commercial disputes as the area in which this phenomenon is most commonly observed. This kind of lawsuit typically takes
place between experienced businesspersons who engage in litigation concerning only serious and substantial disputes and who have the resources
to employ competent advocates. -+ Other categories of legal disputes, such
as family law litigation, employment disputes, or environmental regulation
controversies, present different problems. On the other hand, all legal systems ought to recognize the possibility that procedural rules may be
adapted differently to various kinds of legal disputes, With this in mind, it
is important to note that we refer specifically to the tendency towards convergence of procedural rules in commercial disputes.
1.

Roles of the Advocate and Judge: Traditional Comparative
Discourse

As mentioned above, the traditional differentiation between the civil
and common law systems is the difference in the responsibilities of judges
Set:, e.g., Rolf Sturner, Some European Remarhs on Cl New Joint Project oj the AmeriInstitute and UNIDROIT, 34 I. r'L Lw; 1071 (2000) (discussing the present
state of transnational civil procedure, including the "fundamental difference" of the
roles l)f lawyers and judges in civil and common law systems).
-+ Cj Richard L. Marcus, Malaise oj tht: Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL ]UST1CE I'"
CRISl" Cl )~IP!\R!\TlVE PERSPECTIVES Of CIVll PRUCf:lWRE 7 L 92 passim (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) [hereinafter Zl~cr;LRMANI (discussing the rising costs of litigation in
American courts, which potentially inhibits pursuing claims involving insubstantial
nutlers.).
"3
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and lawyers. This differentiation is basically founded on the assumption
that, in civil law systems, civil cases are actually directed by the judge, with
subordinate participation by the panies' advocates. s An illustration of this
conception of the judge's role is that traditionally it was thought to be up to
him to determine the matters in dispute, identify the necessary evidence,
schedule the necessary intermediate and final hearings, and eventually formulate the judgment according to the law and the proof6 In such a system,
the lawyers' activities may be characterized as residual. They may make
suggestions concerning the evidence, as well as propose either issues to be
examined or questions to be asked at the hearings, or eventually submit
comments concerning the legal basis of the dispute. 7 In a metaphorical
comparison, the judge is conceived as the priest, while the advocates act as
the acolytes-deferential assistants in a ceremony controlled thoroughly by
the judge.
A similar and grossly simplistic conception of the common law judge
is that of a passive moderator between presentations organized and
directed by rival advocates. The fundamental responsibility for identifying
the legal contentions to be considered, the evidence to be considered, and
the ultimate basis of judgment remains with the advocates. 8 Furthermore,
the presence of the jury to determine facts-as in the United States system
of litiga tion - renders the Judge even more passive 9 The jury is bound to
decide the facts on the basis of legal instructions that, while given by the
judge, are initially proposed by the advocates.
Accordingly, advocates in common law litigation are referred to as
"combatants," such as those partiCipating in a tennis or wrestling match,
while the judge acts as an umpire in the traditional metaphor] 0 \7Vhat
seems easy to perceive from these conceptions is that the differences
5. See

GEOFFREY C H,vARD, JR. & ANC,[1.0 DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A CClldl'ARATIVE
63-108 (2004).
6. See John H Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure. 52 U. CHI. L
REV 823,835-45 (1985) (discussing the traditional conception of the German civil pro-

STUDY

cedure system, an oft-used example of a civil Jaw system); John H. Langbein, Trashing the
German Advantage, 82 I w. U L RIY 763 (1988) (same).
7 See, e.g, Erhard Blankenburg & LJlrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated ProfeSSion, ill 2 L.A\VY11,,, IN S(XIITY: TIlt CIVIL L.AW WORLD 124, 133. 135-36
(Richard LAbel & Philip SC Le\\ls cds, ] 988) (discussing the distribution of responsibilities between judges and advocates in Germany); Arthur Taylor von Mehren. Some
Comparative ReJ1eoio11S 011 hrst IllStun(( Civil Procedure Recent Reforms in Grrman Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules, 63 !'\UTRt DAMI L. REV. 609, 609 (1988)
8. MARVIN E rR,\i"KU. PARTh.\'-! jl:<,TICI 1], 25, 75 (J 980); Arthur R. :VlLller. The
Adversary System Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Mll""-:. 1. REV. 1, 14-15 (] 984).
9. C1 Sanja Kurnjak lvkovic & Valerie P Hans, Jurors' Evaluations oj Experl 1i:stimony: Judging the Messenger and lhe 1essugc, 28 L\'vv & Soc. lNQl.JRY 441 (2003) (demonstrating the further weakening of the judge's role in the jury system ""ith regards to
expert testimony): Judith Resnik, Ownging Practices, Changing Rules. Judicial and Congressional Rulema!ling 071 Civil Juries, Ch·i/ Jus1ice and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. 1. Rtv] 33,
136-47 (1997) (discussing some commentary from federal judges on the proposed
expansion of federal civil juries \() twelve memhers).
10. See .A1 Lr\'-i
Hl'TCHI"'CSl ):". lr's Au I". THE GAMt: A NnNJ-Ol.'NnATll)NM 151
AUl )lNI 01- L\'v\ A"J() ADJL:DI(;\1 J(l,,- 288 - 3 19 (2000); sec generally Wavne D Brazil, The
Adversary ChawccC! of Ch·iI DiS(()\'erv: A Critiquc and Proposals for Chanfic, 31 VAi"n. L.
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bet vveen the two allegedly most important law systems are stressed, and
that, in this perspective, these differences seem substantial and, as such,
virtually unbridgeable. In other words. the basic assumption is that the
systems can be defined only by way of contrast, rather than by way of similarities This assumption is in fact commonplace in the traditional comparative study of lavv, especially procedure, and is still perpetuated
nowadays. 1 I

n.

Roles of the Advocate and Judge: A functional Analysis

[t must be said, however, that in commercial litigation, this traditional
contrast seems at least misleading, especially considering that the parties
are generally sophisticated in business alTa irs, have real disputes about
substantial and material matters, and tend to employ experienced advocates to represent them. Of course, the problems of procedure and justice
in other areas, such as family law litigation, in which the parties may be of
unequal competence, the disputes arise out of personal relationships, or
one or both panies lack competent counsel, are different.
A.

Advocates

In both civil and common law systems, the advocates in modern commercial litigation have a primary role in defining the disputes, as well as
the legal and factual bases under which they are adjudicated. However, in
both common law and civil law systems, the judge maintains a pivotal role
in managing the development of the case and the sequence of addreSSing
and resolving issues, as well as a general managerial role in setting each
Single hearing. Regardless, the best metaphor for the roles of judge and
advocates in modern commercial litigation in both civil and common law
systems is that of a committee in which there are representatives for each
different interest(the advocates) and a chairperson (the judge) responsible
for the orderly exploration and resolution of the controversy. Further, in
modern litigation, there are often more than two parties involved-at times
several panies-and consequently the resolution frequently becomes a
combination of adjudication, mediation and negotiation. Thus, some typical elements of the advocate's role in modern commercial litigation must
further be considered.
1.

Selection oj the Forum

In this context, the initiative is clearly with the parties. Usually, the
injured party selects the forum, barring an enforceable forum selection
clause in the contract between the parties As all realistic analysts of civil
RIY 1295 (l978) (providing a classic account 01 ,;(\me of the problems with an adversarial system during discovery).
11. See, e.g., David S. Clark, Comparing the \\'oill unci Organization oj Lawyers Worldwide The Persistence oj Legal Traditions, in L\\\ \II\~' PI\,\C:TICI &: ILJE:Als A COi\.IP,\I\,\TIVt
VIIW 9,35-69 UohnJ Barcelo III &: Roger C (ramtlln eds., 1999) (outlining the differences III the roles of lawyers worldwide).
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procedural realize, this choice is fraught with consequences and affects the
resolution of a legal controversy. However, the judge takes no part in the
initial choice of forum, despite its importance to the ultimate resolution of
the dispute. Traditionally, the judge has only the negative authority to
refuse jurisdiction whenever the initiating party has chosen an improper or
inappropriate forum.

2.

Fonmilation oj Claims and Defcnses

A rule generally found in most legal systems is that the advocate for
the plaintiff formulates the claims to be considered, \\'hile the respondent's
counsel bears a correspond ing responsibility to formulate the defenses and
counterclaims, if applicable These tasks must be accomplished in the con- .
text of the pleadings or, as in 1 he American system, in the pretrial order that
follows the pleadings Similar chances to formulate or change the claims or
defenses after the pleadings exist also in some European systems, for
instance the Italian legal system. In the Italian system, the defendant's
advocate can actually delay the formulation of the response we]] after the
initial phase, triggering either mutual options to respond on the side of his
opponent lawyer for the plaintiff, and a virtually endless postponement of
the actual framing of the case in view of its definition by the judge. 12
On the other hand. the panies' advocates have almost as much room
for this kind of strategic choices in most of the other European legal SYS'3
tems, although with a lesser scope of inherent powers on the side of law~
yers. This is also the case in France, and to an even greater degree in
Germany. The provisions on this subject in the French Nouveau Code de
Procedure Civile provide the advocate-within the boundaries of basic fondcment serieux of each pleading or request 13 -\.vith an extremely wide range
of strategic choices and proCessional undertakings. The lawyer's role is of
fundamental value in the stages of mise en oeuvre de I'action and dcroulement de /'instal1cc, although the lawyer acts with constant judicial supervision aimed at fully carrying out principles "de la contradiction" and "de la
cooperation" bet~l('en 1 he parties' advocates. 14 LikC\vise, the German ZPO
(the German code of civil procedure) grams the lav,1yer a similar range of
options through the \\'ritten complaint (the Klage), which controls the "procedural initiative" in order to properly shape the complaint at the OUlset of
12 C{ Angelo Dondi, Abuse oJ Proct'clural Rights Regional Rcpor(Jill lluly

ullcl

France.

109.
109-12 ( 1ichelc Tarufln ed, 1998) (discussing the lack of a clelmecl concept of --ahuse
of procedural rights" in ItaiJ<.m civil procedure).
13. Sec SJ-:!HJI: Gll"-'(I-l.\RIl I r .-\1 .. DRl"lIT I'R()U~SITL: DROIT ( ()~I\ll " III PR,')Cl:S 520
(2001) (discussing the recent shuffle ill French civil procedure rules) sec also t\'le1ina
DOLlchy, /.( dt'crel 11 98-/]..3) du dr'ccmbrc 1998 modi/Ialll Ie code de l'ol,~anisatio)J
jLldiciorc ['t I" IWll\'CUlI ("de dl' jJlOcrdllre civile l"adoptioll parlicllc des j1lOposuiolls elL! rappore dcJ-iv1. COli/on. rffJrililcd in 2001 CrVI'TTI: Dl P·\Ii\IS IG.\! P\l.] Doctrine II 831
( 1999)
14 [\l)IVHI e";)1 III PI,(\( IP\ RI: CI\'IIJ: I;\CPCj arts \-8.16. '53-59 (96th ed.
Dall,):,: 200-f) (li): '>cc a/'ll J)lhlll Jllll([AIRI. 1'1,1\[ 376 (4th ed Cadwi &: Jeuland eds.
20\)4) 1'1,,)( IP1:Jn CI\'III 437 (Cornu &: rover cds .. 19'10)
ill Alll"-!

l)1
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the litigation though the judge, called the HinwcispJlicht. l '5
In a different cultural context, the recent Spanish procedural reform
embodied in the so-called "LEe 2000" or "LEY 1/ 2000" adopted a similar
interaction between the advocates and judicial power in the initial stage of
a civil litigation The great number of chances to frame pleadings by the
lawyers of each party is fully balanced-as provided by the Articulo 401 of
the new LEY -against the very strong powers of the judge, whose control is
aimed at aVOiding abusive strategies by the advocate in the very beginning
of a civil case 16
B.

Judges

In both civil and common law systems, the courts have authority to
permit amendments to the initial pleadings. Despite this trend, it remains
the exception in civil law procedure, 'vvhere the general philosophy still
favors limiting the occasions for the judge to intervene and allow amendments. l7 Though such an authority is by no means more frequent in the
common law procedure, it is structurally more liberal in this respect. The
much broader power to frame the case conferred to the parties must be
considered, as it allows them to intellectually shape the basis of a legal
controversy.18 Hence, in practice most common law judges do not interfere with parties' formulation of the issues, particularly where experienced
advocates are involved. 19 However, the fact seems to be that in all legal
systems the advocates actually frame the legal basis of a case. The ability to
15 See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STlJR FR, GERMAN CI\·ll.JliSTICE 12-13,166 (2004);
Peter Gottwald, Civil Justice ReJorm: Access, Cost, and Expeclition. The German Perspective,
in ZUCKERMAN, supra note 4, at 207 passim.
16. See JUAN MONTERO AROCA feT AI., EL. '-iLE\'l) PRl)CESO CIVIL. - LEY 1/2000, at
246 -47, 445 (2000); Juan Damian Moreno, Tlwlo [[ Del Juicio Ordinario, in 2
COMENTARIOS A LA NUEVA LEY DE ENJUICIAVUFNTD CIVIL 2081- 2193 (Antonio Maria Lorca
Navarrete ed., 2000): Joan Pico iJunoy, I principi clell1llOvo pmcesso civile spagnolo, 2003
RIVISTA DI DlRITTO PROCESSUAl.l.: [RIV. OIR. PRUc:.! 65 (It.) Bllt see Juan Montero Aroca, II
processo civile "sociale" come strumenlO di gillstizia allwritaria, 2004 RIV. DIR. PROC. 553
(taking a critical approach to the new rules).
17. See, e.g., MliRRAY & STORNER, supra note is. at 23 7 - 39 (stating that the German
ZPO "represents a legislative narrowing of Ithe I tTad itional liberality" of allowing late
submissions of factual or legal materials and that "new claims for relief. . which
change the subject matter of the proceedings
may be added only under limited
conditions")
18. For some fairly recent discussions of the problem, see Edward Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return to Fact Pleadll1g 7, 22 REV. LITlG. 1 (2002); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TF::x, L ReV 551 (2002); Jeffrey A. Parness et
al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleaclings Laws, 78 NEB. l. REV. 412
(1999).
19. See A.l.t.-A.B.A., LATEST DEVELOPMENt'S IN CU'vlPLf:X CIVIL LITIGATION: A A'iAl.Y·
SIS OF THE FeDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER's EW MANu,\L F(\R COMPLEX LITIGAT10N 108 (2003);
Barhara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions for NonJrivoloLls Complaints l Sussman v.
Bank of Israel and Implications Jor the Improper PLUpose Prong oj Rule 11, 61 ALB. l. REV.
1359 (1998): Richard l. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistencc oj Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1749 (1998); see also PATRICK M. GARRY, ;\ \!,TIO:" \11' AIWERSARIES: Ho'vV THE LI1IGA.
TI0~ EXPLOSION IS RESHAPING AMERICA 139 (1997); W.\11FR K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAW.
YERS: Huw THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATL:"~ A\llkIC\'-; RUI.E OF LAW 73 (2003);
Stephen N Subrin &: Thomas O. Main, Honoring DClW! Shapiro: The Integration oj Law
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frame the legal basis of a case has some consequences of fundamental
importance, particularly that the formulation of the legal basis of the case
determines what evidence can be relevant. In other words, the relevance of
evidence is derived from the issues to be determined, and again those
issues are more or less directly derived from the contentions formulated by
the advocates. 2o And in both civil law and common Ia v,; systems it is
within these boundaries, initially established by the advocates for the parties, that the authority of the judge is exercised. Returning to the abovementioned metaphor of the priest, it might be true that the priest-like judge
gives the sermon, but the believer-like lawyers have already determined
from which part of the Bible the lesson for the day will be taken.

1.

Identification of EvideJ1 cc

Broadly speaking, the conventional understanding of rele\'ant evidence
is as follows: The issues determine the relevance, while the law determines
the issues. The formal correctness of this contention is not in question
here. However, what we vmuld like to focus on is the aetual process
through which this relevance determination takes place, and especially by
whom it may be initiated In practice, without exception, the sequence of
analysis building up this determination begins \vith the advocates. particularly the claimant's advocatc 2J Commencement of civil litigation implies a
basic "feasibility evaluation" by the plaintiffs lawyer has occurred: the
advocate will not commence litigation unless he believes thert' is a legally
arguable case. 22 In dctermining whether there is a legally arguable case. an
advocate will have to make a preliminary determination as to whether there
is evidence to SUppOTt the claim. Therefore, he will have pro\'isionally
determined that there is relevant evidence prior to the case being
commenced. 23
~llTRI D.\\II I. RI'\ ] Y81.
2016 (2004).
20. See sources ciled supra nOle ] 6: sec also Shelly Brinker, Commcnl. Openillg the
Door 10 the lndetcrJJ1inatc P/uimiU All Analvsis of the Causation Barriers I-willg FIl\'iIlJllmental Toxic Tort P1Qlnli[{s. 46 L'CLA L R1\. 1289 (1999): Patricia} \lc"Cl '\ote \Vlwl
Congress Said Ahoullhc HeiglltcJIt:,d P!fuding, Slandard: A Proposed Solw;on to till' Sccurities
Fraud Pleading ConfusioJl. 66 fl)RDHi\~'1 L Re" 2517 (1998).
21. Sec FiHlli'C;J."Ml" I-I .·\1. CIVil PRllUDURI 215 (5th cd 2001\ SCI' nlso Ann
Morales OlazabaL The Seor(!J
"Mlddle Ground": Towards u Hal11lV11i::'/'d IIJ/I'Iprcri/(;OI1
of t!Je Privole Sauriries Litigarion RlIorl11 Ad's New Pleading SlaJldard. 6 Si .\'-.. J.L 1)1"- &fl:\ 153 (2001): Parness et al. supra note 18, at -+12
22 SI'C, e.g., Fm R. CI\ P. ] 1 (providiJ1g for sanctions againsl attlJrncys whose ftlings to thC' court are not "warranted by existing law," do not present a \'alid argument for
modification of existing law. or comain facts which lack an evidclltl<H\ basis): Tw

and Fact in an UncJwrll'1cd Parallel Proaduml Univl'1se, 79

101'
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]\1 ..\l'I'O C."PI'HIFTn. FIORF)'(C1. ]2-·13 ])1(1'\11\11'. 2003 pussil11
(\Cicala Tmcker &- \iicen::o Varano C'ds, 2005)
23, TilC'se features alT consiclncd in the Ilalian model of civil litig:llil'n in :-;11<. HII.I·
'[·\RlTI·l). L\ PR()\'t\ UII 1,\1'11 (,Il'I!IDIU: ~-i()/IO:'-J1 CE-:\IR,\11 l!Y<.)2): \'lichck Taruff(,. FU11:::10111' dello pnwa
10 {u11:::ionc di1l1os{ul1iWl. ]<,)97 RI\bl.'\IRl\II'.IR.\11 1)1 11I1,ITI,) r
!'Kl)(IIWR:\ CI\'II 1- IRI\'. TI'I~I DiR. PR,')C, CI\·.j 558: sa ulso L11<.,1 L<'\ll\\!~Il<). L", I'Rl)\· ..\
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In other words, from a functional perspective, the initial cask of determining what relevant evidence exists is a task for the lawyer, not the judge
Further, though the judge determines the relevant evidence on the basis of
the pleadings as they appear to him after the case is filed, it is the advocate
who initially determines the pleadings based on what he considers the relevant evidence to be, as it appears to him before the case is even filecl. H
This pattern is widespread and commonly accepted as unquestionable in
all legal systems-both civil and common law families 2 ')
Of course, the judge retains a nevertheless fundamental role in the
above-mentioned sequence of analysis, \-vhich shapes the core of a legal
lawsuit, framing it for a decision. First of all, and somewhat unavoidably,
it is up to the judge to arrange an orderly sequence for receiving the evidence 26 in doing so, the judge must necessarily give thought to the issues
involved in the case before him and provide direction for their resolution.
Stated differently, the judge must give the case further intellectual treatment, after the initial treatment performed by the advocate before the case
is filed. 27
Generally, the judge framing the case in such a contest will first check
the initial writings produced by the advocates on behalf of their clients 28
The range and quality of these initial controls have a great impact on
whether a procedural system is efficient and effectively aimed at just
results. To reach these goals of justice and efficiency, the judge should not
limit his task to checking the formal package of the claim, though that is
certainly an essential and unavoidable pan of the process 2 l) However, he
should also plunge into the very intellectual and strategic foundation of
24. On this problem, see HAZARD &: DO?'DI, s,tpm note '5, at 63; TP Gallanis, The
Rise oj Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L REV 499 ( 1999) (suggesting that both lawyers'
power over evidence and the exclusionary approach tLl evidence derived from criminal
trials and spread gradually to civil trials); Stephen C Yeazell, The Mis,mderstood Consequences oj Modern Civil Process, 1994 WLS. L RI\ 631 (1994); c} MIRJAN R. DA,,-',\SKA,
EVLDENCf: LAW ADL<.IFT 74-124 (1997) (discussing the lIldividual party's control over
determinations of factual parameters in common la\\' litigations).
25. For an Italian perspective, see Taruffo, supm nOle 2. Some further treatment of
this topic can be found in Hov'v'ARD ABADINSKY, L.·\\\ .\'(P jLSTLCE: A I'iTRODUCTION TO
THE AMtL<.IC\N LFGAL SYSTEM 292 passim (1995)
26. See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Pmcedure, supra note 6, at 826-33.
27. For an overview of the evolution of discovery in the Cnited States, see generally
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these contentions 30
In order to move the case toward a just resolution, the judge ought to
focus his attention on reaching the core of its conflict. This often involves
ridding the case of many of the useless complexities raised in the initial
writings of the advocates for tactical reasons, and figuring out a precise
and determined path towards resolution. 31 To do this, the judge must have
effective and formalized management power and a full understanding of
his duties. However, directing the process in this manner implies a vital
measure of judicial activism, which is functionally required and institutionally sanctioned in all procedural systems, whether civil or common law 32
The 1999 English "Civil Procedure Rules" were recently reformed to
create a greater managerial role for judges 33 The reform was grounded on
the philosophy that wide case management power should be granted to the
judge, especially in the preliminary stage of a civil proceeding. 34 In this
respect, the result of the English reform seems in many ways laudable and
almost amazing for most of the goals it attains. The cornerstone of this
reform is that the judge is now able to evaluate the probable complexity of
a case when it is initiated, in order to set it in the most appropriate of the
three planned procedural tracks, or to determine an ad hoc procedural
framework 3 '5
\t.,lhat seems even more noteworthy here is the very nature and range
of these organizational powers. These powers are not at all static, and provide a far-reaching range of intervention; they actually outline the practical
essence of the traditional notion of managerial judges. 36
In its modern English version, the notion of the managerial judge
might be seen as consisting of various judicial powers, distributed through
practically each successive articulation of a civil lawsuit; they are not limited to the commencement of action stage. Provisions such as those conferring upon the judge the "ultimate responSibility for the control of
(discussing the judge's considerations in determining whether to use alternative dispute
resolution)
30. See gcncrally Hazard, supra note 27 (comparing the discovery system in the
United States with that in other countries). For a European perspective, see 1 AN(;J-j()
Dne-I)[, hi !<',JJ)l'7klNtC 1)111 A Ci\I'SA 1: STRATEGJF DI DIITSA (] 991) (discussing the United
States), and more recently Angelo Dondi, Questi(mi di efJicienza della Jase preparalOric/
ncl proccsso civile slaLHnitcnse (c prospeuive ita/iane di riJor111a), 2003 RI\ TRI~I DIR
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litigation," in Lord Wool fs words, in fact permeate the later stages of litigation in the new English rules. for instance, those rules concerning the socalled disclosure or the selection of evidence demonstrate this responsibility.37 In both these stages, the English judge has been empowered \'\'ith
tools in order to dispose of the case, curtailing the ability of the advocates
for the parties to perform any sort of procedural abuse. 58
Such an active approach to case management, clearly designed to
encourage a hands-on approach by judges, gives at least a hint of the revoILlLionary trend by now pervading the philosophy of civil proceedings in
the common law systems. This philosophy seems some\vhat unexpected
given the similarity to the paradigm of the "judge-centered" civil law systems-often considered completely incongruous.
Ill.

Convergence of Modern Procedural Systems

In the context of the managerial role of the judge in civil litigation, a
noteworthy convergence of the two systems has taken place. This convergence is, of course, more noticeable in some areas of the civil practice, such
as that of the modern commercial disputes.
These disputes most often involve complicated issues that involve multiple and interdependent questions of law and fact. 39 Further, they tend to
involve highly technical issues, sometimes of physical or medical science,
finance, or business or professional judgment that may require the use of
expert testimony, such as scientific tests, accounting analyses, or problems
of foreign law and language. 4o
When issues of this kind are involved, the advocates have an inevitable
advantage over the judges at the outset of the litigation. This, of course, is
not because they are more intelligent or better informed in such matters
than the judges, but rather because in these circumstances clients seek out
37. Sec, e.g., Subrin, Discovery ill Global Perspective: Arc \Ve Nuts?, supra note 27, at
305.
38 For a European perspective, see generally Angelo Dondi, Complessitcl e Gdeguatezza nella riIonna del processo socicrario - Spunti minimi di raIJrolito compamto, 200-+
Rlv. TRIM DlR. PROC. CIV. L37. For the .-\merican view, see generally RICH,\RD L. M·\Rl:L""
& ED\NARD F. SHERMAN, CO~lr'u::x LITI( ;..\ rIll": CASES 1\"-'1) MATERIALS 01': /\DV;\f';CTI) CI\'II
PROCFOURE (2d ed 1992) (explaining lhc [<)[e of judges in federal proceedings); Elizabeth j. Cabraser, Life Aftu Amchem, The Class Struggle Continues, 3 J Loy. LA. L. Rf\',
373 (1998) (noting the role of judges in class action cases); Linda S. iVlullenix, PmetiCClI
Wisdom and Third-Generation Iv/ass Tore Litigation, 31 Luy. LA. L. Rfx 551 (1998) (discussing the role of judges in mass ton litigation).
39. Sec Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake oIDauben' A New SearcllIor
ScientiIic Knowledge, n TEX. L Rn 7l"5. 787 -90 (1994). See generally JOAt'A P-\Gl,
JOA 1':.-\ DAY & LOUISE LE GAT, EXPERT E\'If)r~CE U"iDER THE CPR: A COyl?E' 'OIL;M OF C,\SEc;
tROy! APRil 1999 TO APRIL 200] (2001); D·\\.lo L. FAJGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIF'-JTlfIC
EVIDE0iCE: THE LAW AND SCIE1':CE 01 [.,PIIH TLQl'v!ONY (2d ed. 2002); H.H. Kaufman, Tile
Expert Witness. Neither Frye nor Dauberr Solvcd the Problem. What Can be Done 7 • 41 SCI.
& JUST 7 (2001).
40. See JAY TIDMARSH &. RUCER H TI<\"-.<;GRUD, CO\IPLEX LITICAlION'\ND THI', AIArR
S..\RY SYSTEM 1170 (L 998) See generallv Y!-\RCLS & SHFR\IA"i, supra note 38 (federal
courts); Cabraser, supra note 38 (class aClions); Mullenix, supra note 38 (mass LOn) For
a European perspective, see Dondi. sllpm note 38.
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advocates who are especially adept in handling cases involving such complexities. In any event, when the underlying dispute is complicated, the
judges will necessarily be more depend em on the advocates than when the
court is dealing with a familiar and routine type of dispute.
More and more, commercial litigation tends to involve complexities of
the kind mentioned above. Routine disputes may more readily be settled,
so modern commercial litigation plays a greater pan in shaping the role of
the advocates because they have more interaction with the judges, whatever
the legal system in which these disputes are adjudicated. Thus, the very
subject matter with which modern procedural systems must most frequently contend seems to influence the \vay in which the professional participants function.
Since every procedural system faces similar problems when dealing
with modern commercial litigation. the convergence of the procedures
between common law and civil law systems has become an unquestionable
and steady reality. Consequently, the actual conduct of litigation in modern systems looks more and more similar, whatever the tradition from
which they derive. In fact, these cases require active and creative initiatives
by the advocates, as well as active. attemive, and flexible engagement on
the part of the judges. 41
Of course this does not mean that the differences between the systems
are fully erased. Though the general trend shO\vs the systems are growing
together, there are still areas in \-\'hich civil and common law procedures
cominue to diverge. A noteworthy example is represented by a recem Italian procedural reform enacted in January 2004, concerning the alternative
dispute resolution in the adjudication of commercial cases. 42
Surprisingly enough, the whole philosophy of the new Italian rules is
founded on an ideal of a sharp restriction of the judicial powers, in view of
bringing them back to their allegedly original and inner feature of "sheer
decisional function "403 In order to attain this goal, the judge's role has
been restricted to a mere late appearance past the stages of such importance as the commencement of the action and the pretrial process (with all
the possible discovery activities included). The judge is involved only at
the trial hearing; the remaining function left to the judge is conceived as
limited to adjudicating the case, while the preparation of the facruaJ and
legal terms of adjudication are exclusively performed by the la\,vyers of the
parties. 44
Vlith no hint of earlier judicial intervention in the proceeding whatsoever, the mouei conceived by the Italian legislators seems more apt to revi41. So: Dondi, supra note 38, at 138: Romano Vaccarella, La rij"orn](/ del
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tali:::e ancient conceptions ahout the mutual apportionment of powers
hervv'een professional participants such as judges and advocates, adopting
the approach of the nineteenth century, rather than facing the complex
reality of modern civil cases. This seems even worse because it is concei\'ed to regulate commercial litigation H.owever, the philosophy of the
Italian new procedural rules for commercial cases is an exceptional and, to
the best of our knowledge, isolated event in the perspective of solving the
many problems connected to the management of controversies of this kind
The above-mentioned similarities in terms of the complex questions of
fact and law that these disputes involve. short of the legal system in which
the single case is to be adjudicated, seem to move po\verfully toward an
approximation or a convergence of procedural law. A basic feature of this
progression is an awareness that these cases, while requiring active and
creative initiatives by the advocates, are in absolute need of an even more
powerful engagement and pushing of initiatives by judges.

